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(Post)Revolutionary Interlinkages: Labour, Environment and Accumulation 
 
A review of: Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (Verso, 2011). 
 




In 4(1) Transnational Legal Theory (2013): 108-25. 
 
 
In this collective review, we explore Timothy MitchellÕs Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the 
Age of Oil with a view to reflecting critically on a contemporary historical juncture, which we call a 
(post)revolutionary moment. The review builds on discussions at a seminar we co-organised in Doha, 
Qatar under the auspices of Harvard Law SchoolÕs Institute for Global Law and Policy as part of its 
annual workshop in January 2013.
1 Carbon Democracy is part of a significant body of scholarship 
stretching over several decades where Mitchell explores the relationship between economic expertise 
and the material conditions of socio-economic development. MitchellÕs analyses over the years have 
been wide-ranging in their interests and implications, but his particular focus has been the Arab 
region. In Carbon Democracy, Mitchell maintains this geographical focus, investigating the internal 
mechanics and political repercussions of that quintessential Middle Eastern commodity, oil. Yet this is 
not an ordinary resuscitation of the Ôrentier statesÕ thesis: as Mitchell explains: Ô[r]ather than a study 
of democracy and oil, [this] became a book about democracy as oilÑas a form of politics whose 




For international lawyers, the importance of this non-legal text is both substantive and 
methodological. It draws our attention to a region undergoing historic transformation, the 
repercussions of which are being felt globally, not least in the capacity of the Arab uprisings to inspire 
other social movements for change. At the same time, MitchellÕs methodology provides alternative 
and perhaps more radical ways of understanding law.  
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The title of the seminar, Ô(Post)Revolutionary Interlinkages: Labour, Environment and 
AccumulationÕ, stemmed from our desire, as international lawyers at a global law and policy 
workshop in Doha, to identify analytically productive interlinkages between local, regional, 
transnational and global policy-making spheres and between different areas of expertise and political 
action. We wondered, for instance, whether Qatari migration, labour and human rights law might be 
better understood in light of the international fossil-fuelled economy that influences and shapes 
regional and local economic options and political choices. Conversely, we asked whether international 
economic, environmental or human rights lawyers might profit from a fuller understanding of the 
interaction of their regimes with local contexts. At the local level, the rise of social movementsÑfrom 
the Arab uprisings to tribal movements in South Asia, environmental movements in East Asia, mining 
protests in South Africa, indigenous movements in Latin America, Occupy movements in North 
America and Europe, and other contemporary social mobilisationsÑmade us curious as to whether 
there were any common threads linking these groups and any shared demands of relevance to 
international policy makers. We considered other events that directly or indirectly impacted these 
movements: the Ôtriple FÕ crises of food, fuel and finance in 2007; the collapse of the European 
UnionÕs communitarian ethos; the failure of international mechanisms to address pressing 
environmental challenges; and the economic ÔemergenceÕ of populous developing states with their 
own capitalist class dynamics and strong-fisted approaches to indigenous issues and radical politics. 
In light of these developments, we identified three phenomena that cut across various global demands: 
the pauperisation, deregulation and casualisation of labour; environmental degradation; and spiralling 
disparities of wealth and power. While separately none of these phenomena led to the layered 
contextual understanding we sought, our objective in focusing on interlinkages between them was to 
allow such an understanding to emerge. 
 
Such interwoven crises present a number of methodological and substantive challenges. Here, 
MitchellÕs text offered a helpful method and analytical trajectory. We realised that our struggle to 
make sense of our times was not due to the complexity of actual conditions, but rather to our limited 
capacity to conceptualise or articulate issues beyond our disciplinary affiliation, and to our reliance on 
the conventional political and legal organisation of the nation state and the jurisdictional assemblage 
that gravitates around it. It is a testament to MitchellÕs methodology that he conquers this challenge.  
 
At our seminar, the challenge was also to unite an audience with expertise in diverse but relevant 
fields to address issues of common concern together. We invited four scholars, each with close 
connections to different parts of the world, to think fluidly about (post)revolutionary interlinkages and 
how to engage with these links in useful ways. Sheila Jasanoff and Hani Sayed began by focusing on 
questions of method in the context of the Arab uprisings. Dennis Davis, Kerry Rittich and Luis Eslava 
broadened the focus to look at interlinkages in other parts of the world. The discussion ranged from 
the merits of Ôco-productionÕ as a method capable of taking into account the power of ÔthingsÕ in 
relation to human wills (Jasanoff), to the assault on the Cairo Zabbaleen communityÕs system of 
rubbish collection and recycling by an alliance between the Egyptian government and transnational 
capital (Sayed). A recurring theme was that of an ongoing global project of ideological 
reconfiguration, whether the recasting of labour politics as an issue of public health in the case of the 
Zabbaleen; or RittichÕs critique of the idea that Ôan economyÕs health is better measured by stock-
markets than by labour marketsÕ; or, as Eslava argued, the Ecuadorian notion of the Ômature leftÕ 
designed to allow Latin American governments to accept a certain amount of environmental 
degradation and dispossession of indigenous land without sacrificing their socialist credentials. The 
importance of method was reiterated, for bringing into effect and naturalising such reconfigurations, 
as well as for creating the conditions under which resistance takes place. MitchellÕs materialist 
approach, his inattention to non-carbon materials or carbon beyond coal and oil (particularly relevant 
to the situation in South Africa, as Davis noted), encountered some criticism. Nonetheless, Carbon 
Democracy was understood as an important intervention, one which made visible the material limits 
of contemporary democracy for addressing poor labour conditions, environmental degradation, and 
increasingly unequal distributions of wealth and power. In the following three sections, we each 
consider, through the lenses of labour, environment and accumulation respectively, the substantive 




What triggered the ÔArab SpringÕ? For the development economist Hernando De Soto one thing is 
clear: Ôit wasnÕt politics, it was economicsÕ. Purporting to reveal the ÔrealÕ identity of the Tunisian 
fruit-seller whose self-immolation on 17 December 2011 in protest at the seizure of his stock by local 
officials unleashed the wave of popular uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa region, De 
Soto declares: Ôabove all [Mohamed Bouazizi] was a repressed entrepreneurÕ. This, he continues, Ôis 
why BouaziziÕs death resonated so strongly and became a unifying force across the culturally, 
politically, and religiously diverse Arab world, from Morocco to SyriaÕ. To commit suicide over Ôthe 
loss of $225 worth of goods and a regular location on the street for a fruit stand seems inconceivable 
to most people in the United States and EuropeÕ, De Soto declares. Yet, 
 
BouaziziÕs counterparts throughout Tunisia and in the extralegal economies in the rest of the 
Arab world understood immediately his desperation. In their eyes, Bouazizi had not been just 
the victim of corruption or even public humiliation, as horrible as they are; he had been 
deprived of the only thing that stood between him and starvationÑthe loss of his place in the 




De SotoÕs willingness to transform Bouazizi, the all-too-real Arab worker stripped of his social rights, 
into an imagined universal figureÑthe Ôrepressed entrepreneurÕ lacking adequately transparent and 
enforceable property rightsÑis characteristic of current thinking in international, regional and 
national financial and ÔdevelopmentÕ institutions. The ÔsolutionÕ such thinking points to is obvious: 
tackling poverty requires growth (rather than redistribution); and growth, in the post-ÔstagflationÕ era, 
requires nothing less than the ÔformalisationÕ of the informal economy, mandating the expansion of 
the ÔfreeÕ market into every nook and cranny of social life, to encompass every slum-shack, every tuk-
tuk, every fruit-stall.
4
 The Ônegative externalitiesÕ associated with growth can be dealt with later by 
ÔgoodÕ governments disciplined by means of bilateral investment treaties, international loan 
agreements and conditional debt swaps, to limit their capacity for intervention to the role of ÔpartnerÕ 
in privatisation schemes. The function of ÔdemocracyÕ in this context, equated with the holding of 
periodic Ôfree and fairÕ elections, is not so much to give human societies a say over what form and 
direction their collective existence should take as it is to protect and legitimate this ever-expanding 
market.  
 
With the concept of carbon democracy, however, Timothy Mitchell is able to give an entirely 
different account of the relationship between labour, environment and accumulation, both in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. In this account, workers are conceived not as frustrated profit-maximisers 
but rather as human beings harnessed to each other, to their physical environment and to the products, 
tools and techniques by means of which they earn their living by a complex web of symbiotic 
relationships. This is an account which emphasises real physical relationships over assumed 
psychological drives. One of Carbon DemocracyÕs most powerful insights is that the more the global 
economy isolates workers from one another and places them at a distance, not only from the products 
of their labour but also from their physical surroundings and from the social costs arising from the 
process of production, the weaker is their capacity to mount effective demands for a more equal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  Hernando de Soto, ÔThe Real Mohamed BouaziziÕ, Foreign Policy (16 December 2011) 
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4  See eg World Bank MENA Development Report, From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-Led 
Growth in the Middle East and North Africa (2009) viii-xiv 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Privilege_complete_final.pdf> accessed 18 
February 2013. The Introduction asserts, Ô[a]ll countries in the region face a pressing employment 
challenge: about 40 million jobs will need to be created in the coming decade. A young and increasingly 
well educated labor force is looking for opportunities to use their skills and creativity. Governments will not 
be able to create these jobs in the public sector Ð nor will state-owned enterprises in a sustainable manner. 
The jobs will have to come from the private sector É That is what this report is about: enabling new 
generations of entrepreneurs to play a bigger role in the growth of their countries.Õ
distribution of resources and for a safer environment for their childrenÑthat is, for a more 
ÔdemocraticÕ form of democracy. 
 
It is MitchellÕs central argument that the emergence of what is known today as ÔdemocracyÕ on the 
one handÑnamely a system of rule by popular ÔrepresentativesÕ, legitimated by means of periodic 
elections, in which issues of social justice are treated as only one set of policy options among many, 
rather than as a fundamental aspect of the legal and institutional framework within which policy-
making must take placeÑand the emergence of oil as the worldÕs primary source of energy on the 
other, were part of precisely the same process. As discussed by Eslava below, MitchellÕs unique 
methodology draws its inspiration from contemporary approaches to social production in which 
material relations are understood to be no less important than social and ideological relations. 
MitchellÕs analysis of democracy in the age of oil begins neither from the standpoint of political 
theory nor from the critique of material distribution, but rather from the objects and techniques 
associated with energy extraction. Mitchell rejects an orthodox understanding of such objects and 
techniques as mere instruments through which modern man enacts his mastery over ÔnatureÕ and in so 
doing reproduces his subjectivity. On the contrary, Ôin tracing the connections that were made 
between pipelines and pumping stations, refineries and shipping routes, road systems and automobile 
cultures, dollar flows and economic knowledge, weapons experts and militarismÕ, he insists, Ôone 
discovers how a peculiar set of relations was engineered between oil, violence, finance, expertise and 
democracyÕ (253). 
 
Mitchell explains how the transition from renewable energy sources to coal and steam power not only 
made possible the industrial revolution (thereby setting in motion the twin processes of capitalist 
globalisation and climate change) but also established the conditions necessary to ensure that demands 
to mitigate the devastating effects of these process on workers, in the Western metropoles at least, 
would be (temporarily) successful.  It was a feature of the mining industry, he points out, that moving 
carbon stores from the coal seam to the surface created unusually autonomous places of methods and 
workÕ, contributing enormously to the militancy of the miners and to their capacity to organise, strike 
and sabotage productivity effectively (20). At the same time, minersÕ strikes were apt Ôto spread 
through the interconnected industries of coal mining, railways, docking and shippingÕ (23). For, as 
Mitchell explains: 
 
The rise of large industry had exposed populations to extraordinary forms of social insecurity, 
physical risk, overwork, and destitution. But the concentration and movement of coal required 
to drive those industrial processes had created a vulnerability. Workers were gradually 
connected together not so much by the weak ties of class culture, collective ideology or 
political organisation, but by the increasing and highly concentrated quantities of carbon energy 
they mined, loaded, carried, stoked and put to work. The coordinated acts of interrupting, 
slowing down or diverting its moment created a decisive political machinery, a new form of 
collective capability built out of coalmines, railways, power stations, and their operators. More 
than a mere social movement, this socio-technical agency was put to work for a series of 
democratic claims whose gradual implementation radically reduced the precariousness of life in 
industrial society. (27) 
 
In this way, the very physicality of industrial labourÑthe real dimensions of workersÕ conditions and 
practices during the era of coal-powerÑgave rise to the possibility of the alleviation of their 
exploitation (though not, of course, its elimination). 
 
It is at this point, during the inter-war period, that oil enters MitchellÕs picture. For coal-powerÕs 
inbuilt ÔvulnerabilityÕ was soon addressed by those who stood to lose most from the introduction and 
protection of workersÕ rights by means of the conversion of American and then, thanks to the 
Marshall Plan, Western European industry from coal to oilÑoil sourced primarily from European-
controlled parts of the Middle East, and transported to industrialised parts of the world by means of 
pipelines and tankers. The effect on the ability of labour to organise effectively was catastrophic, 
Mitchell argues: 
 
[W]hereas the movement of coal tended to follow dendritic networks, with branches at each 
end but a single main channel, creating potential choke points at several junctures, oil flowed 
along networks that often had the properties of a grid, like an electricity network, where there is 
more than one possible path and the flow of energy can switch to avoid blockages and 
breakdowns. 
 
Oil produced, say, in Iraq (then the British mandate of Mesopotamia) could now be shipped anywhere 
in the world by vessels registered under flags of convenience, allowing labour regulations neatly to be 
sidestepped. In this way, Ô[t]ransoceanic shipping operated beyond the territorial spaces governed by 
the labour regulations and other democratic rights won in the era of widespread coal and railway 
strikesÕ (38). 
 
As this analysis suggests, current orthodoxy regarding democratic transition in the Middle East (or the 
lack of it)Ñnamely the Ôrentier statesÕ thesis, according to which resource-rich states like Saudi 
Arabia are able to buy off or simply suppress potentially revolutionary populations using their 
abundant oil revenuesÑis oversimplified. For as Mitchell points out, Ô[t]he transformation of oil into 
large and unaccountable government incomes is not a cause of the problem of democracy and oil, but 
the outcome of particular ways of engineering political relations out of flows of energyÕ (5). Carbon 
democracy is, in other words, a global phenomenon. It describes the United States no less accurately 
than it does Iraq: the difference being that in one, labour rights hard won such as the minimum wage 
and maternity leave have gradually been eroded with the shift from coal to oil, whereas in the other, 
the internationally supported emergence of the oil industry prior to the emergence of (carbon) 
ÔdemocracyÕ ensured that such rights would never be fully implemented. What links them together, of 
course, is the (global) economy.  
 
Contrary to orthodox accounts, which trace its birth to the eighteenth-century economic theories of 
Adam Smith (whose now-classic image of the pin factory is deconstructed by Eslava below) and 
David Ricardo, Mitchell insists that the economy emerged Ôas an object of calculation and a means of 
governing populationsÕ only in the mid-twentieth century, as a direct consequence of the emergence 
of the oil industry. For it was oil (together with technological innovation) that allowed the classical 
assumption of scarcity to be overturned: if resources were unlimited, then growth could be conceived 
as infinite, and concerns over environmental externalities and unequal distribution could be cast to the 
wind (234). Crucially, however, it is for Mitchell precisely in the instability of this economic 
conception of the relation between nature (Ôbelow groundÕ) and society (Ôabove groundÕ) associated 
with carbon democracy that the potential for emancipatory change is contained. For if the shift from 
plant to coal to oil energy brought into being new modes of governance (or Ôsocio-technicalÕ 
organisation), he argues, then the growing scarcity of available oil and the search for new sources of 
energy and methods of extraction also contain possibilities for the creation of a space in which 
workersÑvulnerable human beings situated in an equally vulnerable physical environmentÑmight 
again be able to intervene successfully. As he puts it,  
 
In response to threats as widespread as peak oil or climate collapse É rival technical solutions 
become experiments in the composition of the collective world É These situations offer 
occasions not simply to defend existing democratic rights or extend them to others, but to re-
democratise the forms of democracy. (240) 
 
How should we assess this cautiously optimistic conclusion? The answer we give will relate, perhaps, 
to our response to the question posed at the start of this section. In light of the thesis laid out in 
Carbon Democracy, what did trigger the ÔArab SpringÕ? Mitchell himself makes the point that Ô[b]y 
and large, the less oil a country produced, and the faster its production was declining, the more readily 
the struggles for democracy unfolded. Tunisia and Egypt, where the uprisings began, and Yemen, 
Bahrain and Syria, where they quickly spread, were among the regionÕs smallest oil producers, and in 
most of them production was decliningÕ (1). Can we, as this suggests, attribute the uprisings to the 
temporary breakdown of Ôcarbon democracyÕ? Was the ÔArab SpringÕ in fact the outcome of a long-
term failure on the part of resource-poor Arab states to prevent their out-of-work workers from 
organising and demanding change as human beings, resulting from an inability to provide the very 
jobs which would have locked these human beings into the global carbon economy at a safe distance 
from one another and from their social and physical environmentÑa failure itself attributable, at least 
in part, to the spiralling costs of imported oil in recent decades? Many things have changed since 17 
December 2010, however, and todayÑas rivers of money and weapons flow into post-revolutionary 
Arab states from hyper-capitalist Western states and international institutions on the one hand, and 
from oil-soaked Gulf states on the other Ð a further question springs to mind. Can we link the broken 
promises of the Middle EastÕs new ÔdemocraticÕ governments to a successful reconfiguration and 
reassertion of Ôcarbon democracyÕ in the region? The price of US ÔsupportÕ laid out by Barack Obama 
in the wake of the first wave of uprisings may give us all the answer we need:  
 
[I]tÕs important to focus on trade, not just aid; and investment, not just assistance. The goal 
must be a model in which protectionism gives way to openness; the reins of commerce pass 
from the few to the many, and the economy generates jobs for the young. AmericaÕs support 
for democracy will therefore be based on ensuring financial stability; promoting reform; and 




If the powerful international institutional and legal complex for which De Soto and Obama stand is 
successful in recasting oppressed workers as Ôrepressed entrepreneursÕÑwith the implication that a 
living, far from being an entitlement, is on the contrary something which must be scraped out from 
such hairline cracks between costs and revenues as only an ingenuity born of desperation could 




Environmental issues such as climate change are often transboundary in nature, involving complex, 
interconnected ecosystems that may transcend state borders, as well as globalised chains of 
production, consumption and waste. International environmental law evolved in an attempt to manage 
such issues. From its inception in the 1970s, this area of law has been polarised by a strong north-
south divide that, in more recent years, has manifested as a stalemate on international cooperation for 
issues such as mitigating climate change. Broadly, the debate consists of environmentalists in rich 
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5  ÔBarack ObamaÕs speech on Middle East Ð Full TranscriptÕ, The Guardian (19 May 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/19/barack-obama-speech-middle-east> accessed 4 March 
2013, emphasis added. For a penetrating analysis, see Adam Hanieh, ÔEgyptÕs Orderly Transition? 
International Aid and the Rush to Structural AdjustmentÕ, Jadaliyya (29 May 2011) 
<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1711/egypts-%E2%80%98orderly-transition%E2%80%99-
international-aid-and-> accessed 7 March 2013. 
states demanding that development occur in environmentally sustainable ways, and developing states 
insisting that they will alleviate poverty by whatever means available without being held hostage by 
environmental problems that developed states created.  
 
MitchellÕs text directs us out of this stalemate and towards more profitable debate in two ways. First, 
it moves international lawyers beyond state interest and interstate cooperation by revealing the 
inextricability of (i) the public and private spheres of law and (ii) local, national, transnational, 
international and comparative law. Such an understanding illuminates the relationship between the 
natural environment and politics and reveals how structures of privilege and subalternity are 
systemically reinforced both in creating environmental problems and in circumscribing available 
solutions. Second, MitchellÕs analysis complicates the north-south relationship by describing the 
tangled web of mutually reinforcing interests across developed and developing states that underlies a 
lack of progress on addressing environmental problems.  
 
On the first point, Mitchell asserts a link between the types of fuels that energise our lives and the 
politics we produceÑor, to put it more broadly, between the state of nature and the nature of the 
state.
6
 The term Ôcarbon democracyÕ derives from MitchellÕs argument that fossil fuels make 
democracy as we know it today possible and fossil fuels also prescribe limits to democracy. The two 
dominant fuels of industrialisation, coal and oil, are both produced by subterranean stores of carbon. 
When compared with renewable fuels such as wood, coal and oil provide exponentially more 
concentrated amounts of energy. Their nature derives from the compression of vast quantities of space 
and time: Ôorganic matter equivalent to all of the plant and animal life produced over the entire earth 
for four hundred years was required to produce the fossil fuels we burn today in a single yearÕ (15). 





Coal and oil differ in nature. Coal extraction requires a larger workforce than oil in relation to the 
quantity of energy produced. Thus, as Parfitt reviews in relation to labour above, coal miners working 
in large groups underground may develop a degree of autonomy and expertise. In contrast, oil workers 
are fewer in number and work on the surface where production expertise is diffused amongst 
engineers and managers. There is usually a single conduit from the production of coal to its use, 
which can be slowed or disrupted by workers at any point along the way as a means of realising their 
demands. As oil is light, fluid, easily vaporised, and leaves little residue compared with coal, multiple 
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6  See further Usha Natarajan, 'TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of the State, and 
the Arab Spring' (2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law 177. 
7  Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles (New Left Books, 
1976 ed) 154, as quoted by Mitchell at 6. 
pathways for its transportation and handling are easily established, making the supply process flexible 
and difficult to disrupt. The location of coal deposits is readily known and it is useable after cleaning 
and sorting. However, exploration for oil is complex and it has to be refracted into various 
hydrocarbons before it is useable. Mitchell describes how, from exploration to production, from 
research and development to marketing and promoting their products and services, the oil industry is 
more capital-intensive, has more extensive networks, and more opportunities for asserting exclusive 
expertise. He argues that the nature of fuel affects our politics in various ways, including the ability of 
workers to realise their demands and thus the functioning of representative democracy (see Parfitt 
above), a global economy dynamised by the mythic possibility of endless economic growth and thus 
tied to exacerbating inequality and environmental degradation (see Eslava below), and the creation of 
disciplines that circumscribe our ability to resist harmful consequences. 
 
In tracing how the material world shapes our ideas, Mitchell considers our calculationsÑwhat we 
count, how we count, and why we count itÑand the construction of the discipline of economics. He 
observes that perceptions of scarcity and plenty are central to this process. The accessibility of coal 
and oil in the last two centuries provided abundant energy that fuelled economic growth at 
extraordinary, unprecedented rates and encouraged new types of calculation based on the possibility 
of unlimited economic growth. This context shapes how we measure our economy. Instead of 
counting a nationÕs wealth, economists count its aggregate incomeÑthe sum of every instance of 
money changing handsÑbecause each such instance represents income to the recipient regardless of 
the transactionÕs productiveness or waste. As goods and money can theoretically change hands 
limitlessly, the same goods or money may be counted multiple times. Additionally, the waste incurred 
as income is generatedÑthe exhaustion of natural resources, labour and machineryÑis not counted. 
Mitchell describes this as a process whereby economics withdraws from studying the capacities of 
nature and natural resources and turns instead into a science and technology of commodification and 
pricing.  
 
Additionally, to count things accurately, a finite boundary is helpful. For economics, the central frame 
is that of the nation state. Economists have reproduced the institutional structure of the state within 
their discipline as evidenced in the basic distinction between macro and microeconomics. As with 
other state-based disciplines such as international law, the geopolitical construction of such spaces 
and the ensuing negative consequences for certain peoples, places and things is obscured. As a result, 
our capacity to understand and effectively address concerns that transgress national boundaries, such 
as environmental issues, becomes limited. For instance, the traditional assertion of a stateÕs 
sovereignty over its natural resources does not adequately address, and in many instances has 
compounded, the plight of many of its most impoverished citizens, who are not only prevented from 
benefiting from these resources, but additionally suffer most from the negative impacts of 
environmental degradation. 
 
Thus, through exploring the relationship between the hydrocarbon age and the development of 
economic expertise, Mitchell undoes the ostensibly commonsensical notions of the economy and what 
it counts, and the dividing up of the common world into areas of public and private concern and their 
corresponding legal regimes. As Mitchell observes, in todayÕs economy nature speaks to us primarily 
through measuring devices and tools of calculation (233), which in turn function with reference to the 
state. It is then unsurprising that our solutions to environmental problems are limited by the same 
frame and therefore tend to be equally technocratic and economic: carbon markets and emissions 
trading schemes, debt for nature swaps, incentivising funds for technology transfer and clean 
development mechanisms, promoting ethical or green consumerism, and so on. Indeed, since the 
measurement of the economy makes no distinction between beneficial and harmful costs, Mitchell 
points out that the increased expenditure of dealing with environmental damage appears as a spur 
rather than impediment to growth (140). He describes the economy as a space between culture and 
nature: Ôthe object of economics was not the material forces and resources of nature and human 
labour, but a new space that was opened up between nature on one side and human society and culture 
on the otherÑthe not-quite-natural, not-quite-social space that came to be called Òthe 
economyÓÕ(132). He points out that such a space is strategically located to claim a variety of topics as 
subject to determination by technical expertise rather than democratic debate (124). Many 
environmental issues have fallen prey to just such a move.  
 
On the second point, MitchellÕs central argument regarding the link between hydrocarbons and the 
nature of democracy rests upon a consistent deep engagement with past and present strategies of 
empire. Mitchell addresses the role of international law and organisations in empire, from Lassa 
OppenheimÕs understanding of protectorates in his 1920 treatise to Antony AnghieÕs work on the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations, from the 1884 Berlin Conference to the Bretton Woods 
organisations and OPEC. For Western states, the 1870s to the First World War was the age of 
industrialisation, democratisation and empire. This combination is unsurprising, as Mitchell observes, 
because utilising fossil fuels requires a rapidly expanding control of territories (18). Similarly, with 
regard to Western democratisation, Lugard stated that Ôthe democracies of to-day claim the right to 
workÕ, but without the raw materials produced in the colonies Ôthe satisfaction of that claim is 
impossibleÕ (101). Through the lens of empire, there are numerous continuities between the use of 
coal and that of oil. ÔThe switch in one part of the world to modes of life that consumed energy at a 
geometric rate of growth required changes in ways of living in many other placesÕ (16). Relative to 
renewable fuels such as wood, coal and oil require considerably less land to supply energy. However, 
ever increasing amounts of land are needed to produce the industrial raw materials to which this 
exponentially increasing quantity of energy is applied, especially for the production of concentrated 
food energy. This transformed aspects of everyday life in the colonies, affecting available choices 
with regard to clean air, water and food, health, shelter, employment, and politics, among many other 




Mitchell emphasises that the operations of empire are simultaneously straightforward and nuanced, 
through hegemonic assertions in a mixture of private and public spheres, religious and secular 
spheres, material and ideal spheres: ÔRather than assume that control of Middle Eastern oil was the 
imperial or strategic interest of Britain, Germany, US, etc; or that it served the national interest of 
producer states; we will ask who mobilised these claims and for what purposesÕ (45). For instance, oil 
companies portray their efforts to control the global supply of oil as important, not for their own 
profits, but for securing and furthering the imperial interests of states. The profit incentive is high as 
oil offers the possibility of being sold at one hundred times the cost of production. As oil was 
abundant in the twentieth century, producers risked undercutting each otherÕs prices. Thus, profits 
could be maximised only if mechanisms were put in place to create scarcity through anti-market 
arrangements. The control of Arabia is essential to maximising profit as its massive production 
capacity is pivotal to creating either scarcity or surplus. As oil profits depend on those who control 
Arabia, Mitchell points out that it is an Islamic movement that has made possible the enormous 
revenues of the oil industry: the muwahhidun (adherents of Wahhabism, a sect with strict 
interpretations of Islam) in alliance with the House of Saud (205). Conversely, these forces derived 
and maintain their power from oil and its industry. As a region with numerous entrenched conflict and 
security issues, Western statesÕ payment of massive petrodollar reserves to Arab oil states could be 
recouped by selling weapons to the same governments, who remain Western arms suppliersÕ largest 
customers. Thus, the oil industry has created and sustained a world where its products thrive.  
 
Contemporary analyses of the nexus between energy resources and global environmental policy tend 
to focus on technical fixes through, for example, expanded use of clean energy technologies or more 
efficient energy use. While these are worthwhile endeavours, MitchellÕs description of the supply side 
of the fossil fuel economy shows why coal and oil will inevitably continue to be dug up and used as 
long as they remain accessible, thus limiting the usefulness of such endeavours in mitigating issues 
such as climate change. While accessible oil supplies are not easy to estimate, it is unlikely that new 
sources of oil can be found at a rate that keeps pace with the decline of existing fields and rising 
consumption in developing states, including in major oil producing states such as Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. The share of available energy exports consumed by China and India is increasing and, as the role 
of the West as major consumers of oil from the Arab world declines, the extension of MitchellÕs 
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analysis to new global energy partnerships with the East will be of increasing importance. Likewise, 
his hypotheses may be tested and perhaps strengthened by application to regions of the world where 
economies are largely fuelled by coal, such as China and India. 
 
By tracing the link between fuel and politics, one of MitchellÕs aims is to expose a web of 
interconnected incentives and strategies helpful to those concerned about environmental degradation. 
The ÔcarbonÕ in carbon democracy refers not only to coal, oil and its by-products, but also connotes 
the termÕs contemporary currency with regard to climate change. The international communityÕs 
incapacity to collectively mitigate climate change leads Mitchell to observe that Ô[t]he political 
machinery that emerged to govern the age of fossil fuels É may be incapable of addressing the events 
that will end itÕ (7). Since the advent of Western environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
oil industry has participated in defining the nature of environmental crises and promoting particular 
solutions. For instance, Mitchell describes how, when the increase in oil prices threatened to make 
affordable rival sources of energy such as nuclear power, oil companies joined Ôthe effort to frame the 
environment as a new object of politics and to define and calibrate it in particular waysÕ (192). He 
points out that, like the economy, the environment is not simply an aspect of external reality; it is a 




What we call ideals are ways of speaking, and of referring to the words of others, that acquire 
this general, disembodied circulation. While appearing to be nonmaterial, with the incorporeal 
form we attribute to ideals or principles, terms like self-determination and democracy acquire 
their lightness and transportability through specific practices. To understand their effectiveness 
we need to follow the work done to strip such terms of the varied circumstances that produce 
them, to translate and mistranslate multiple claims into a common idiom, and to build the 
acoustic machinery of their circulation (69). 
 
Such a method provides profitable avenues of inquiry for addressing challenges of resource scarcity 
and ecological change. Mitchell rightly observes that people have always demanded a less precarious 
life. What was missing in certain times and places was not consciousness, nor a repertoire of 
demands, but an effective way of forcing the powerful to listen. Thus, uncovering the materialities 
that underlie the modern environmental movement will help us successfully resist environmentally 
harmful tendencies. What is the link between these materialities and the ideals that the 
environmentalism today transports in an age of climate change? Does the movement hold within itself 
some of the seeds of failure? Such questioning better identifies points of vulnerability in existing 
paradigms, allowing for strategic resistance to the downward spiral of environmental degradation, 





Sir, the insolence of wealth will creep out. 
Samuel Johnson (1778) 
 
In this collective review, my task is to discuss Carbon Democracy through the lens of accumulation, 
the third of the conceptual phenomena whose inter-relationship my co-authors and I consider most 
useful when reflecting critically on our (post)revolutionary present, in light of recent events in the 
Arab world and beyond. But before I embark on my task, I would like to make a more general point 
about how the relation between the economy and the constitution of social and productive relations 
has traditionally been understood in social sciences and policy circles. To do this, we need to return to 
one of the foundational texts of our modern world: Adam SmithÕs An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Revisiting SmithÕs classical framing can help us to place the 
question of accumulation in a broader analytical framework and at the precise level on which Mitchell 
invites us to understand the motions and political effects of our current global economy. 
 
The Wealth of Nations was published for the first time in 1776. At the beginning of the industrial 
revolution, SmithÕs text brought together a new way of understanding productive relations, the class 
and labour structures in a capitalist system, and the mechanics of wealth accumulation at the local and 
international scales. To facilitate his analysis of these complex facets of the new global political 
economy emerging at the time, Smith mobilised the image of a pin factory at the start of his book. 
With a voice full of admiration and a sense of achievement, Smith narrates how the division of labour 
in the pin factory epitomises the way in which productivity is increased, and wealth is reused and 
expanded in industrialised societies. According to Smith, in the processes that occur within the walls 
of a pin factory, industrialised societies radically depart from the ÔscantinessÕ that characterises life 
Ô[a]mong the savage nations of hunters and fishersÕ.
9
 Although in these savage nations Ôevery 
individual who is able to work is more or less employed in useful labourÕ, Ô[s]uch nations É are so 
miserably poor, that from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves 
reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, 
their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or be devoured by 
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wild beastsÕ.
10
 In contrast, Ôamong civilised and thriving [industrialised] nationsÕ, Ôa great number of 
people do not labour at allÕ; Ôyet the labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly 
supplied, and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may 





SmithÕs optimistic reading of the workings of the pin factory conceals the particular class-labour 
relations and the environmental externalities that result from the process of industrialisatioMurray 
minutlife in from Australia all the wscreen and even I know that I can all that we can drink because 
are now guys chocolate with which she the video below zero yeah actually spending up all day really 
might down which is not yes yes is I just this is not very flexible so I just left that thing and yeah I like 
it DragonDictate pay grey has I just like publications you are just providing, the of all record and so 
should mongers stranger you can drink you like when looking for a professor and upper so the while 
these games to diary three another one drill for formal but floral unity Riddell your working was by 
you Si SimSimSimilarly, the pin factory was, and still is, an enabling metaphor to assessÑin the 
negative senseÑthose large sections of the worldÕs population which subsist on alternative non-
industrialised political economies, and in this way to forget about those who find themselves on the 
losing side of the process of industrialisation. Most importantly, however, SmithÕs pin factory has for 
a long time been a powerful statement about how we should conceive of the relation that exists 
between the economy and the larger activity of world making that is conducted under the banner of 
ideas such as modernity, economic growth or development. 
 
The power of the image of the pin factory resides in its capacity to place the larger human and 
material universe that revolves around the productive system beyond the scope of our analytical radar. 
Maybe because of their insignificant or innocuous character, the ÔpinsÕ of the pin factory, as well as 
the workers and their surrounding environment, are silent characters in SmithÕs account. They are 
muted and docile elements that exist solely as appendages of proto-Fordist assembly lines. By 
allowing commodities, workers, natural landscapes, raw materials and the sources of energy that keep 
machinery moving in the factory to slip away from our attention, Smith seduces us with an image of 
the economic system that is disassociated from the social, political and cultural world that solidifies 
around such nodes of production. 
 
For Smith, the world at large is, as a result, a galaxy of factors of production and market exchanges 
that can be controlled and profited from through rational adjustments. In this peculiar separation 
between the economic world and the rest of the world resides the possibility of crafting thriving 
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economies regardless of any potentialÑand potentially unforeseenÑripple effects. Economics, 
politics, and law become here instruments of facilitationÑactivities to ease the progression of our 
economic history. As Susan Marks has recently reminded us, thanks to this understanding of 
economics, politics and law, we now live in a world where material and human superfluity are far 
from exceptional. Excessive consumption and wealth, repulsively maldistributed across regions and 




It is emblematic, in this context, that the image of Adam Smith and his pin factory should adorn 
English £20 notes. In a world in which the financialisation of the economy has in many ways 
superseded production as suchÑat a time when we are facing a global financial crisis as a result of 
this de-materialisation of the economyÑSmith and the pin factory have become fetishes for money 
decoration. And in doing so, they have confirmed the success of their own creation: namely, an 
economic system in which it is possible to justify environmental degradation, the managerialisation of 
labour relations, and unlimited wealth accumulation on the basis of economic expansion. To confirm 
this impression one simply needs to look at the systematic depletion of natural resources, the erosion 
of labour conditions, and the sharp increase in socio-economic inequalities across the world since the 
end of the Second World WarÑthe same period in which the world economy has experienced the 




The analytical framing that we have inherited from The Wealth of Nations is didactically reversed for 
us in Timothy MitchellÕs new book. Deploying a particular sensitivity to the study of material 
relations,
14
 and tapping into a growing interest in the analysis of commodities as a way of approaching 
world history,
15
 Carbon Democracy brings to the forefront of our examination the crucial role that 
factors intrinsic to the economic system, as well as background and surrounding factors, play in the 
constitution of our world. 
 
At a general level, Mitchell demonstrates how the nature of commodities, workersÕ actions, 
environmental transformations, geopolitical intricacies, social asymmetries, and modes and means of 
production are all inseparable aspects of the way in which the world is made through the economic 
system. At a more particular, and perhaps more substantive level, Mitchell shows us how what 
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becomes possible in this process of world making through the economic system is not always dictated 
by human inventiveness or by humanityÕs self-proclaimed will to progress and developmental 
ingenuityÑthe typical liberal entry points when it comes to narrating world history. 
 
Reading Carbon Democracy, we realise that the horizon of possibility in the entanglement between 
the economy and our world is drastically shaped by those primordial factors that give form to the 
global economic apparatus, in particular the kinds of resources that we use to propel our industries 
and the types of political processes that such resources allow or inhibit. 
 
With a detailed analysis of the shift from a coal to an oil-based global economy, in Carbon 
Democracy Mitchell unpacks how environmental conditions, the power of the working classes and, 
most importantly, the distribution of wealth amongst countries and social classes are decided neither 
in the high realm of managerial practices or diplomatic negotiations nor on the earthier terrain of 
social mobilisations. Instead, the resources that fuel the global economyÑthose resources that make 
of it a hyper-producing apparatus for the generation and accumulation of wealthÑset in motion the 
basic conditions through which we come to participate in, experience and possibly change our reality. 
 
As Parfitt and Natarajan show above, Mitchell invites us to think in terms of how the world that 
emerges through the economic system is one in which the situation of the environment, labour 
conditions, and the distribution of resources are determined, to a large extent, by the natural 
characteristics of coal or oil. The reading offered in Carbon Democracy is not, however, 
deterministic. On the contrary, in revealing the undermining effects that an oil-based economy has 
had on the environment and the political processes facilitated through coal mining, Mitchell opens up 
a new set of questions about how international law, labour regulation and the economic discipline as a 
whole were readily adapted in order to intensify the power dynamics and destructive effects that oil 
unleashed. Through each of these different bodies of knowledge and regulation a disjointed image of 
the relationship between the economy and the greater world has been solidified. Things like 
international law, labour regulation and the discipline of economics have functioned as regimes of 
enunciation through which a particular distorted understanding of nature has emerged: one that has 
been promoting, already for a very long time, Ôways of living and thinking that treat nature as an 
infinite resourceÕ (231). In this process, value extraction and wealth accumulation have been not only 
amplified, but also legitimised. 
 
With regard to international law, Mitchell offers abundant examples of the ways in which 
international legal principles and categories have been deployed and re-moulded in order to magnify 
the effects of our reliance on oil. MitchellÕs accounts of the way European and North-American oil 
companies mobilised a wide array of international legal concepts, such as self-determination, or the 
Ôconsent of the governedÕ, in order to secure their hold on Middle Eastern oil sources during the last 
part of the nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth century (66Ð108), and of the way 
EuropeÕs economic apparatus was forcefully shifted towards oil after the end of the war via the 
Marshall Plan (27Ð31), are just a couple of examples that clearly illustrate this point. In the case of 
labour regulation, Carbon Democracy outlines an entire genealogy, tracing current discussions about 
the decimation of labour standards and the global concentration of wealth in a few hands back to the 
emergence of labour practices over the previous century in which the excess of low-cost energy that 
resulted from the exploitation of oil dispersed workersÕ control over production. 
 
In the case of economics (which in many ways operates, according to MitchellÕs account, as the 
normative horizon for international law and labour regulation), the abundant low-cost energy released 
in the shift from coal to oil transformed the field of economics from a discipline concerned with the 
exhaustion of natural resources and the conditions of material life into a science dedicated to the study 
of money circulationÑÔa circulation that could expand indefinitely without any problem of physical 
limitsÕ (234). As Mitchell puts it, Ô[e]conomics became a science of money; its object was not the 
material forces and resources of nature and human labour, but a new space that was opened up 
between nature on one side and human society and culture on the otherÑthe not-quite-natural nor 
quite-social space that had come to be called Òthe economyÓÕ (234). 
 
Importantly, this shift resulted not simply from the turn to oil as the main source of power. It took 
place at the end a long transformation in which a selective, all too human, political process took place. 
In this sense, the birth of an economy based on oil and secured through legal arrangements and new 
labour practices facilitated a form of global political economy that was not only de-materialised and 
de-natured; it was also intentionally, and excessively, biased towards particular actors and nations. 
The following fact renders the output of this process painfully clear: Ô[T]he $240bn US net income 





That in our current timesÑin our times of crises!Ñwe should be reading such statements in the global 
media, while remaining fully aware that almost nothing significant is likely to happen that will reverse 
such global maldistribution of wealth, only confirms the deep political, economic and juridical biases 
that structure our existence on this planet. 
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After reading Carbon Democracy, it becomes clear that the current state of affairsÑa situation in 
which 100 people could solve global extreme poverty with simply one quarter of the wealth that they 
amassed in the midst of a global crises, and in which we do not have any legitimate means to ask them 
to do soÑis neither the fault of oil, nor of any other inanimate political economic force. Such material 
forces certainly frame our present; yet they remain subservient to those actors and nations, and to that 
part of ourselves, happy to let such a reality go unchallenged. If Mitchell is correct, then subverting 
and taking control of the modes in which we conceive of and manage the relation between the 
economy and the world, of those things like law and economic knowledge and the institutional 
apparatus behind them, is our first dutyÑand may be our only chance. If we remain pusillanimous, 
however, the ÔinsolenceÕ of this odious maldistribution of wealth will certainly continue to Ôcreep 
outÕ. And most importantly, those revolutionary acts that pepper our present, in the Middle East, as 
well as in Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, Europe and North America, will continue to be reduced 
and repackaged as just expressions of people (of repressed entrepreneurs) claiming to be part of the 
narrative of growth and development that was put in operation by Smith more than two centuries ago; 
a narrative in which they are already a part of, yet on the losing side of, the equation. To oppose these 
captures, which Parfitt explores in detail in her review above, we need to understand that todayÕs 
(post)revolutionary moment is about substantially reconstituting the terms and conditions that support 
our existence on this planet. 
 
 
 
